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Forthe past 50years, mortgagedebthas been repaid in a relatively
predictablemariner.Amortization occurred according to a prespecified
schedule,andPrepayments took the form ofeither a lumpsum uponthe sale
ofthe house collateralizing the mortgage or occasional doublemonthly payments
as households saved via accumulation of housing equity. Households movedmore
frequently in some parts of the country than others but, in general, the
determinants of household mobility were quite stable and predictable.Prepayment
for wealth accumulation was attractive because alternativeinvestments--savings
accounts--paid low interest rates. On average, 30-year mortgages terminated
in the twelfth year,
History is unlikely to be a reasonable guide to future mortgage terminations
because mortgage rates have both risen sharply and become generally more
volatile since 1979. We might anticipate numerous complete prepayments (re-
financings) without the sale of the underlying house if mortgage rates decline
sufficiently from their recent heights, On the other hand,inthe l970s and
especially recently, we have observed a sharp increase in assumptions of existing
mortgages when the underlying houses were sold and a related rapid growth in owner-
financing, Moreover, gradual prepayment of mortgages (double payments) is
improbable because yields on alternative household investments have become far
more attractive.
The present paper is divided into three sections, We begin with the develop-
ment of models explaining the economics of the refinancing and assumption decisions.
Having identified the variables influencing these decisions, we then simulate the
models for different parameter values to determine under what specific conditions
households will refinance or assume. Finally, we draw some implications of these
results for;(1) the impact of a decline in mortgage rates on the
asset portfolio elds of mortgage lending institutions—2—
and (2) the simulated effect of the observed rise in interestrate
volatility, including the optimal terminations response of mortgage
borrowers, on the terms of the mortgage contract and the returns to
mortgage lenders on recently issued mortgage loans.
I. Models of the Mortgage Termination Decision
The ex post tennination of a mortgage reflects the exercise of the
borrower'soption which is often related to the observed course of
interest rates in a way that reduces the ex post yield to investorsj
If rates on newly—issued mortgages decline below the coupon rates on
existing mortgages sufficiently to outweigh the costs of refinancing
(includingclosing costs, repayment penalties and additional points
charged the borrower), then most homeowners will terminate mortgages and
refinance at the new lower rates. This eliminates the capital gain that
otherwisewould accrue to mortgage lenders. On the other hand, if
mortgage rateson new issues rose above the coupon rates on existing
mortgages, then homeowners who would normally tenninate their mortgages
upon the sale of their houses will instead be encouraged by the new
buyers to allow assumption of the old mortgages, lengthening the mort-
gage life and increasing the capital loss accruing to lenders. This
section develops explicit models of the refinancing and assumption
decisions. The analysis assumes level—payment, fixed—rate financing.
A.Ref inancings
Just like corporations, households may be expected to repay (call)
existing debt and refinance if it is financially advantageous to do so.
The following model predicts that a mortgage will be called when the present
1For evidence on this point, see Curley and Guttentag (1974).value of expected benefits exceed the costs. The modelconsiders only
financially motivated refinancings.
The paymenton a level payment mortgage of amount X and maturity N
carrying a fixed rate i, where a denotes the period the mortgage was
originated, is
(l+i
PAY(i ,X,N) =xJ H o °LCi+i —1
Thefactor in brackets captures the amortization of themortgage. The
principal outstanding on this mortgage in period k is
PRIN(i ,X,N,k) = 0 (1+1)—
Finally,the payment on the mortgage if it is refinanced at rate for
the remaining maturity N—k is2
PAYCik. PRIN(i ,X,N,k), N—k] =ikPRIN(i.x,M,k)
If the borrower expects to maintain the mortgage for L additional periods
(1 CN—k)and 1k represents the appropriate discount rate for all future periods,
then the present value of the expected benefits of refinancing in period k are:
the initial loan had a maturity of 30 years and is refinanced after
5 years, then the new loan is assumed to equal the outstanding loan and to
have a maturity of 25 years. Note that the new payment is identical to the





LF'A?(i,X,M) —PAY[i,PR1N(i,X,N,k), M—k] }'RIN(i ,...)— PRIN(i,,..)
br= ——--—- ° ____p
k t-k i-k
t=k+l
The last term, which is zero if L =M,reflects the difference in amortization
rates of the two mortgages. The benefits are obviously greater the larger
is the decline in i, the greater was the amount of original mortgage (X),
the larger is the remaining principal (the lower is k) ,andthe longer the
borrower expects to maintain the mortgage (the larger is L)
The cost in period k of refinancing the remaining balance of the mortgage
is
crk =
wherethe term in parentheses reflects normal closing costs and repayment
penalties (u) plus any additional points that may be chargedthe borrower
(v) to provide a "below market" coupon rate. The v term includes points
paid by the buyer and points paid by the seller but builtinto the price
of the house, and both u and v are expressed as a percentageof
principal. Refinancing will be profitable in periodk if brk_crk >
The benefits and costs of refinancing are plotted in Figure1 as a
function of k. The height of crk depends solely on the initial principal
and the cost parameters, u+v. The crk schedule declines monotonically, although
quite slowly at first, as the mortgage amortizes.The height of the brk
schedule depends on the expected holding period L and the decline in i (iO_ik)
as well as the initial principal. The brk schedule also declines morotonically
31f a call appears only marginally beneficial to a borrower at time k,
but there is a significant probability that a call will be substantially
more beneficial at some future period, even after discounting the interim




































with the amortization of the existing mortgage. Because theshapes of the
schedules are so similar, the refinancing decision isquite insensitive
to k. Either the decline in the mortgage rate is sufficient totrigger
refinancing, given L and u-h', or the decline is not. The schedulesare
drawn such that the household will refinance.
B. Assumptions
Just as large declines in interest rates tend to shorten the average
life of outstanding mortgages, increases in interest rates can lengthen
the life of these mortgages dramatically. All FRA/VA mortgages contain
assumabilityclauses. Ibile most conventional loans written since 1970
contain 'due—on—sale" clauses, an explicit prohibition of the assumability
provision, these clauses have proven somewhat difficult to enforce.
Moreover, due—on—sale and asstmability clauses only apply on the
transfer of title; homeowners can choose not to rre precisely to avoid
tenninati.ng the rrnrtge contract. This may be thought of as an "implicit
assumption"by the existing owner. It isidentical from the investor's
perspectiveto an assumption by a new buyer.
The benefits to the assumDtion, explicit or implicit, of an
existingloan are exactly analogous to the benefits of refinancing;
the present value of the expected benefits of an assurnotion is the
discounted savings from naking payments on the outstanding principal
at the lower old rate rather than at the higher current rate. In fact,
we can siuply write
bak =_brk
4SeeSanders (iq8l) for astate by state analvsis of the enforcahilitv of due on sale.
Its lelity is currently being considered by the Supreme Court.—6—
Thecost of an explicit assumption is the discountedextra outlays
madeon the financing of the remainder of the housepurchase that would
otherwise be financed at the current mortgage rate, If the house (and
thus the T1rol" loan) has risen in value at rateir(inflationnet of
depreciation) and the financing rate for the 'loan" inexcess of the
assumption is i, then the payments are
SN-k
PAY(i,n,X,M,k)=isl(l4)kx-PRIN(i,X,M,k)]
The expression for the payment on this loan if itwere financed at
PAY(ik)7r)X,M,k), has an identical form but with 1k replacing i. The
costs of assumption, then are






Of course, if i =—ifthe household is sufficiently wealthy
thatit can borrow the increrrental funds (effectively use its ovn
resources) at the rate on first ritrtges, then there are no costs
to assumotions, and all assumable mortgages will be assumed if mortgage
ratesrise at all. On the other hand, i could exceedthe secondary
itrtge rate to the extent that the combined monthly mortgage payment on
the assumed and second mortgages exceeds that on a first mortgage and
that the household faces a siiificant cash—flow constraint. The combined
payment could be higher, even though the average interest rate on the
assumed and second mortgages is less than that on the first mortgage,—7-
owingto the shorter remaining tenn of the assumedmortgage and the
typical short tenn of second mortgages. Thus —
i<likely varies
over t lire, depending on the cash flow position of the marginal borrower
that must be induced to purchase a house with an assumablemortgage.
The cost of an implicit assumption is the loss of real incomeand/or
the misallocation of consunction between housing and othergoods owing
to not moving. That is, one might forego a more lucrativejob, if it
requires relocation, or one might not "dovmsize" or "trade up" in
responseto changes in real income and/or the real price of housing
services. These costs are discussed and modeled in Hendershott and
Ru (1982) and (Hendershott (1982). In the presentpaper, we consider
the costs of explicit assumptions only.
The costs and benefits of assumption at a given point in time are
plotted in Figure 2 as functions of k. Thecak schedule rises (from
zero) initially as the amount of the second mortgage rises owing to
ii> 0and amortization of the first mortgage. However, at some point
(rouily k =ft'2)the costs decline, owing to the shorter period
(remaining expected loan life) over which the costs will be paid.
The height of the cak schedule is largely detenoined by i . The
bak schedule declines monotonically as the period over which the benefits
arecumrrrulated becorres pro-essively shorter. Its height depends
primarilyon how far interest rates have risen since the original
mortgagewas obtained (ik —i0).The schedules are drawn so that the
mortgage will be assumed if the underlying house is sold prior to
period k. Prior to this period, bak >cak;later, ba c















































































































mortgagethat is received by the seller. This valueobviously depends
upon i — aspread that is determinea in the relevant local market
for assumed mortgages. This detenydnation is illustratedby the supply
and demand schedulesfor a standard unitof siguificantly (say 2%)
"below—market"assumable mortgages drnwn in Figure 3.Thestandard unit
is defined as a combination of principal, maturity and below—market
coupon rate such that the present value of the stream of interest
savings is a thousand dollars. Thus, bak equals $1000 for the unit.
The supply curve in Figure 3isthe number of these units made available
to the market by sellers in a given period. The higher the price paid
for each unit, the greater the number offered. The demand depends on
the liquidity or cash—flow constraints of households that desire to
purchase houses. For households with no constraint (they can easily
supply own equity for the entire difference between the sales price and
the amount of ah assumable mortgage), the deithnd is horizontal atbak.
At a sufficient supply, households facing constraints mast be drawn
into the market by lower prices; thus the demand curve eventually falls
off.The higher the level of interest rates, the more binding are
cash—flow constraints, and the greater is the fall off in demand.
The solid schedules in Figure 3mightrefer to the situation at
the end of 1977. The supply is limited because virtually no mortgages
were issued inthe1969--l977 period at a rate siguificantly below the
late 1977 rate of 9percent.As a result, —i<was low for the marginal
investor,as was cak. Thus, the net benefit of assumDtions was close
to the gross benefit.
The sharp jump in mortgage rates in the last four years has had











































































































































































below—market, assumable mortgages grew enormously .Second,many
potential homebuying households have become severely cash—flow
constrained. This twists the demand schedule clockwise. The net result
is a sharp drop in the net benefit (bak —
cak)relative to the gross
benefit
(bak).
C. The addition of Taxes
Taxesalter the above expressions ina fairly straight-forwaz
manner. Let interest payments of the relevant household be deductible
at rate 0. Equations (1) and (3)arethen changed in two ways. First,
the discount rate becomes an after tax rate, i =(1—°'kSecond,
the difference in the streams of tax savings on interest payments must




For caK i replaces i0.
We also must change the expression for the cost of refinancing.
If points charged the borrower toprovidea below—market rate are the
only deductible costs, then the correct expression is:
crk =-'0-
11. Some Simulation Results
In the following pages we compute the netgains (benefits less
costs) from refinancings and assumptions for various values of the
key parameters. These values are selected to enable us to deduce(in
Section III A below) how far interest rates will have to fall fromrecent
levels in order (1) to trigger massive refinancings and(2) to deter
the continued assumption of old mortgages (thosecarrying 8 and 9
percent coupons) upon the sale of the underlying houses.
A. Refinancings
The parameters key to the refinancing decision are the difference
between the original and current mortgage rates, 10-ik,and the
upfront fees and points, u +v.The higher are the points1 the more the
mortgage rate must decline in order to make refinancing
profitable. In fact the relationship is virtually a linear one. With
a holding period of 12 years, a mortgage life of 30 years and an initial
mortgage rate of 15 percent, the issuer will gain from refinancing if
—1k*fu+(1-S)v]
within the first twenty years of the mortgage life. For exaniple, if u
were 0.02 and v iero, then the mortgage rate need only decline to 14½
percent. In contrast, if v =0.08.a decline to 12½ percent is required.
This approximation is roughly correct for tax rates of zero and 0.3.—ii —
Whilethe calculation is most heavily influenced by the declinein
the mortgage rate and the upfront charges, the calculation is also
sensitive to the effective remaining holding period of theflowner if it
is short. The impact of variations in M and L are illustratedby the
data in Table 1.In the first three rows, the remaining effective
holding period is assumed to be the remaining life of the mortgage
(L =M-k).As is shown, a 1½ percent decline in the mortgage rate
(from 15 percent and assuming upfront fees equal to 6 percent of the
mortgage) will produce profitable refinancing if the decline occurs
before the remaining maturity falls below 10 years, regardless of the
original maturity of the mortgage. This result holds for household
tax rates of 0.0 and 0.3.
Rows 4-6 illustrate that the refinancing decision is sensitive to
the expected holding period and that the household tax rate matters if
the expected holding period is not long and the Srtgage rate declines
by a particular amount. In these calculations, the original maturity of the
mortgage is 30 years, and the effective holding period is 8 years. With
this short a holding period, the 1½ percentage point decline in the
mortgage rate (from 15 percent) will trigger refinancing for households
who take the standard deduction ( =0.0)only if the decline occurs before
the fourth year after origination. For households in the 30 percent tax
bracket, even an instantaneous decline of This magnitude will not induce
refinancing. Rows 5 and 6 suggest that 2 or 2½ percentage point declines
will induce refinancing even-as late as the 24th year of the mortgage. The
















































































































































































































































































































































































Recall that the trade off driving the assumption decision is the
lower costs on the existing mortgage vis a vis the extraordinary costs
(second mortgage rate greater than first mortgage rate) of the second
mortgage. The greater has been the increase in mortgage rates since
the mortgage was issued, —i,the more profitable is assumption.
On the other hand, the greater is the excess of the second over the first
mortgage rate i — andthe larger is the portion of the total
financing taking the form of the second (the greater is the net inflation
rate, rr, and the time since the original mortgage was issued, k),
the less profitable is assumption.
In the calculations presented below, the rate on second mortgages
has been set two percentage points above the rate on first mortgages.
This constant difference reflects two offsetting factors. On one
hand, we would expect the difference to rise as the maturity of the
second rises because lenders tend to charge higher rates on longer term
second mortgages. On the other hand, the longer is the maturity of the
second, the less likely is the cash flow on the assumed and second mort-
gages to pose a problem for the borrower. The original mortgage is assumed
to carry a 9 percent coupon and have a iife of 30 years.
Thedata in Table 2 indicate howincreases in new-issue mortgage
ratesraisethe desirability of assumption. In the upper half of the
table, the gross benefit of assumption is reported for households in zero
and 30 percent tax brackets assuming a 7 percent net inflation rate,
roughly the rate in the U.S. between 1972 and 1981. The percentage
capital gains 4, 8, and 16 years after origination on a 9 percent coupon,-
-14-
30 year mortgage are listed for different vajues of thenew issue
mortgage rate. As can be seen, with new issue yields in the 15 to17½
percent range, the capital gains are enormous. For mortgage issued
in 1978 (four years ago),thegain is 30 to 40 percent of the original
value; for mortgages issued in 1974 (eight years ago), the gains are
only 4 percent less-. Eight years from now the gains would still be in
the 20 to 25 percent range. In general, the gains are 3percent less
for those in the 30 percent tax bracket than for those notpaying taxes.
The data in the lower half of Table 2 refer to the net benefit of
assumption.5 The last year in which the mortgage will be assumed is
reported, as are the percentage net gains on the old mortgage that will
exist after the fourth and eighth years. The results are reported for
two net (of depreciation) inflation rates. Of course, the higher is
the inflation rate, the smaller are the net gains from assumption
upon sale of the underlying house because a larger portion of the sale
price is financed at the higher second mortgage rate.
Consider first the results for a 7 percent net inflation rate. A one
percentage paint increase in the mortgage rate to 10 percent will induce
an assumption only if the house sale occurs within 4 years after the
mortgage was first originated. An increase from 9 to 15 percent, in
contrast, will lead to an assumption if the sale occurs within the first
15 years of a 30-year mortgage (12 years of a 20-year mortgage). If the
sale occurs at the end of the fourth year (1982 for a mortgage originated
in 1978), the gain to the seller is 29 percent of the face value of the
mortgage. At the end of the eighth year, the gain is still 21 percent.
5The reported results are households taking the standard deduction and
are little different for households in the 30 percent tax bracket. The
last year in which the mortgage will be assumed is, at mOst, one year
less and the percentage capital gain is never reduced by as much as
one-tenth.-15-
TABLE2
TheAssumption Decision: Initial Mortgage Rate (i0)of0.09 and
OriginalMaturity (M) of 30 Years
A. Gross Benefit: inflation rate (it)=0.07
tax, rate (e)= 0.0 tax rate (8) =0.3 New Issue % Gain % Gain % Gain % Gain % Gain % Gain
Mortgage After After After After After After
Rate (ik) 4 Years 8 Years 16 Years 4 Years 8 Years 16 Years
.10 8 7 4 6 6 3
.125 23 20 13 20 17 11
.15 34 30 20 31 27 17
.175 42 38 26 39 34 22
B. Net Benefit: tax rate (8) =0.0
NETINFL&TIQN RATE (it) =0.07 NET INFLATION RATE (iT) =0.12
New Mortgage Last Year % Gain % Gain Last Year % Gain % Gain
Rate(ik) Mortgage WillAfter After Mortgage WillAfter After
Be Assumed 4 Years8 YearsRe Assumed 4 Years8 Years
.10 5 2 0 3 0 0
.125 12 18 9 7 14 0
.15 15 29 21 10 26 11
.175 18 38 30 12 35 21- -16-
Witha net inflation rate of 12 percent, assumption is less
attractive;
assumption will occur only about two-thirds as far into the life of the
mortgage as was the case for a 7 percent net inflation rate. To
illustrate, with a current market mortgage rate of 15percent, assumption
would occur through the tenth year; with a 17½percent rate, the net
gain after 8 years is 11 percent.
The above calculations explain both the passions generated by the "due-on—
sale" controversy and the growth in owner financing. There are enormous gains
at stake. Sellers with low rate mortgages surely would like to avoid giving up
the gains (to the lenders from whom the gains were received). If owner financing
is required, so be it. Moreover, there are other interested parties such as
realtors. In a depressed housing market owing largely to high real and nominal
interest rates, house sales are down and so are real house prices. The incorpor-
ation of special financing terms (based on the favorable terms on the existing
mortgage) into a sales contract both increases the volume Of sales and maintains
the list house price upon which fees are earned. If due-on-sale clauses were
rigidly enforced, then many households who would otherwise move would maintain
their existing homes.6
III. Implications of the Calculations
The above analysis has at least two interesting implications. The
first is the likely impact of a decline in mortgage interest rates
from their current high level on the return mortgage lenders are earning
on their existing portfolios of mortgage loans. That is, at what interest
rate level will old mortgages earning 9 percent and less cease being
assumed(will the rate of repayments at thrifts return to normal) and
6See Hendershott and Flu (1982)..17
atwhat level will recent issues of mortgages earning 15½ to 18percent
be refinanced? The second implication is for the value of theterminations
call option in recent mortgage contracts. Our calculationssuggest that
movements in mortgage rates within the range observed in the past four
years can have an enormous impact on the life of a mortgage because most
issuers terminate their mortgages to their economic advantage and to the
disadvantage of lenders (call the mortgage if rates fall and put it if
rates rise). As a result, the expected return to mortgage lenders could
be significantly less than the promised return. To compensate, Jenders
will charge an up front "origination fee" or a highermortgage coupon rate
than they otherwise would. Hypothetical values of thiscompensation are
computed.
A. Declining Interest Rates and The Return on Thrift Asset Portfolios
Declining interest rates might be expected to restore thrift profit-
ability through two channels. First, and most obvious, the cost of funds
would fall. This is not of concern to us in this paper. Second, some of
thelow-coupon mortgages made in the l970s might be terminated sooner than
otherwise with the funds reinvested at higher rates. That is, the profit-
ability ofassumptions would decline, and the incentive to "stay put" with
anexistingloan would be diminished. This would, of course, augment earn-
ings only gradually over time as the underlying houses were sold.
The above analysis suggests that the decline in new mortgage rates
would have to be substantial for the profitability of assumptions to be
reduced sufficiently to eliminate the assumption phenomenon in the near term,
except possibly in very high inflation areas like California. Mortgage18
rates in 1981 fluctuated between 15½ and 18 percent. The data inTable 2
implied that with r =0.07a decline to 12½ percent will not deterassump-
tions on the 9 percent mortgages issued as early as 1973 untilat least
1987.
Mortgages issued prior to 1973 are less likely to be assumed because
oftheir shorter remaining lives but more likely to he assumed becausethey
carry lower coupon rates (between 7¼ and 8½ percent for the mid 1969-mid
1973 period and down to 6 percent for the early 1960s).Ouranalysis sug-
gests thatthe new mortgage rate must decline below 13 percent for there to
be any significant reduction in the near term in assumptions of 30year mort-
gages issued after 1965. In higher inflation areas, a reduction in the new
mortgage rate to 13 percent would virtually end the assumption phenomenon.
Rather than ending the assumption phenomenon, declines in mortgage
rates in the near term are likely to trigger substantial refinancings, and
these would occur instantly (they do not depend on the sale of the under-
lying house). If new mortgage rates should fall to 13 percent, then prob-
hably half of all the mortgages issued since the beginning of i980 cou]d
profitably be refinanced. This would, of course, offset some of the bene-
fits of the decline in the cost of funds of thrifts.
B. Mortgage Values and Coupon Rates
The value of a mortgage is the discounted present value of the total
cash flow it generates. If we are certain that the mortgage payments wili
7The assumption of mortgages originated in the first half of the 1960s
will be stifled, and the principal of these 30-year mortgages still exceeds
half of its original value. However, the size of these mortgages was
quite low owing to the low price of houses (and relatively low loan—to-
valueratios) at that time.19
be made and that the mortgage principal will be prepaid at the end of the
kth year, then






where y is the yield on a pure discount bond of maturity t.
There is, of course, a large array of termination patterns that might
occur with significant probability, at least one for every future interest-
rate scenario. Moreover, each scenario implies a different set of discount
rates (y's). For simplicity, assume that there are three possible interest
rate patterns: rates can rise, fall, or remain the same. We denote these
patterns by y(TJ), y(D) and y(C), where U denotes up, Ddown, and C constant.
If the probability of rates rising is p and of rates falling is also p. then









The arguments in the PAY and PRIN functions are dropped, except for the pre-
payment date, because they are the same as above. Note that interest payments
are deductible at the lender's tax rate S and that after-tax discount rates
are employed.20
Consider the case where the prepayment (termination) of a 30-year
mortgage is assumed (by the lender) to be independent of future interest
rates and is expected to occur at the end of the twelfth year. Assume
further that the mortgage and discount rates are 15 percent and that
interest rates are expected with probability p to average 15½, 16½ and
17½ percent in the next three periods and to average 18 percent thereafter.
Assume further that rates are expected, again with probability p, toaverage
14½, 13½, and 13 in the next three periods and y percent thereafter. If
p =0.2and y =12.64,then a mortgage loan of X will be valued at X by tax-
exempt investors. The data in the exogenous row of Table 3 indicate how
the changes in interest rates affect the value of the given mortgage pay-
ment stream. The value when interest rates are constant at 15 percent is
set at unity. When rates rise, the payment stream based on a 15 percent
coupon falls in value to 0.89 or by 11 percent. The decline in interest
rates is specified such that the increase in the value of the payment stream
is also 11 percent.
Now let the prepayment decision be endogenous. More specifically,
assume that the mortgage will be prepaid (refinanced) at the end of the
third year when interest rates decline but at the end of the twenty-first
year (assumed until then) when interest rates rise. These responses are
consistent with the refinancing and assumption calculations made above. The
data in the second row of Table 3 demonstrate the impact of endogenous term-
inations on mortgage value. When the mortgage life shortens to 3 years with
the decline in interest rates (refinancing occurs), the increase in mortgage
value is only 3 percent. That is, the terminations response wipes out 70
percent of the capital gain that occurred when the mortgage life was fixed at- -21-
Table 3:Interest Rate Changes and
Mortgage Value for Mortgages
with a 15 Percent Coupon
Prepayment Year and Value of Payment StreamTotal Value
Rate =12.64%Rate=15% Rate =18% (p =0.2)
Terminations Year ValueYear ValueYear Value
Exogenous 12 1.11 12 1.0 12 0.89 1.0
Endogenous 3 1.03 12 1.0 21 0.87 0.980
Table 4: Interest Rate Uncertainty and
the Premium in Mortgage Coupon Rates
TaxRate =0.0 Tax Rate =0.3
y(%)TotalValue Mortgage Premium y (%) TotalValue Mortgage Coupon
(Par =1.0) (basis poipts) (Par =1.0) (basis points)
0.1 12.94 0.990 19 12.80 0.990 24
0.2 12.79 0.980 41 12.65 0.980 50
0.3 12.74 0.969 66 12.60 0.969 80-22—
12 years. Moreover, the capital loss in response to an increase ininterest
rates is exaggerated by the lengthening of mortgage life to 21years (assump-
tions occur). Here, however the impact is not large; the loss is increased
by about 15 percent.
The last column in Table 3 indicates that the value of the mortgage falls
by 2.0 percent. This is the cost to the lender of giving the borrower the
option of terminating the mortgage at his discretion. An upfront fee of 2
points (or percent of par mortgage value) would offset the decline in mortgage
value--would equate the expected yield on the mortgage to that on a "mortgage"
which terminates with certainty at the end of the twelfth period.
The total-value columns of Table 4 show how changes in the probability of
significant increases or decreases in interest rates (in p) affect mortgage
value for lenders in 0.0 and 0.3 tax brackets. As can be seen, the relationship
between p and value is negative and approximately linear. Mortgage lenders
can charge borrowers for the terminations option over time via a higher
mortgage coupon rate and thus greater monthly payments rather than by a single
upfront payment. The results of converting the single payments into higher
coupon equivalents are listed in the mortgage-premium columns of Table 4.
In these calculations, we determine how high the mortgage coupon rate would
have to be to maintain mortgage value at par even when adverse terminations were
expected. The results indicate, for example, that a 41 basis point premium in
the mortgage rate (a rate of 0.1541) would be appropriate when p =0.2for
tax-exempt investors. As can be seen, the premium is approximately a linear
functiGn of p, and the premium is about 20 percent greater for investors in
the 30 percent taxbracket.-23—
In the period after October 6, 1979, when theFederal Reserve appeared
to deemphasize substantially the importance itattached to interest rate
stability, interest rates have been far more volatile than inpreceding years.
To illustrate, the standard deviation ofexpost one-month returns on 20-year
Treasury bonds over a one year period has roughlyquadrupled from 1¼ percent to
5 percent. In terms of our analysis, this should havelead mortgage lenders
to raise their estimate of p substantially. Asa result, calculations of
effective mortgage yields that incorporate the cost of theterminations option
should have risen relative to yieldson, say, 1O-year Treasury securities.
If the increase in p were from 0.1 to 0.3, then abouta half percentage point
relative increase in mortgage coupon rates should have occurredor lenders
should have charged an additional two points upfront. A similarexperiment
was performed with larger possible changes in interestrates, namely increases
to 16, 18, 20 and 21 percent thereafter and declines to 14,13, 12 and z percent,
thereafter, where z is such that mortgage value is unity for the relevantp
when the year of termination is maintained at 12. In thiscase, an increase
in p from 0.1 to 0.3 would raise thecoupon rate by 100 basis points.8
8Between 1978 and late 1981, theyield on pools of near-par GNMAs rose by
over 100 basis points vis a vis the yield on a comparable maturity portfolio
of Treasury securities. Hendershott and Villani (1982) haveattributed this
increase to an increase in the termination or call option inmortgage
coupon rates.References
A.J. Curley andJ.M.Guttentag, "The. Yields on Insured Residential Mortgages,"
Explorations in Economic Research 1 (Summer 1974).
P.H. Hendershott, "Mortgage Capital Gains and Housing Demand," Quarterly
Review, Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati (2:1982.).
P.H. Hendershott and S.C. Hu, "Accelerating Inflation and Nonassumable
Fixed-Rate Mortgages: Effects on Consumer Choice and Welfare," Public
Finance Quarterly 10 (April 1982).
P.H. Hendershott and K.E. Villani, "The Call Premium in Mortgage Rates:
An Interpretation of the Changing Spread Between Mortgage and Bond
Rates," inimeo 1arch 198I.
B. Sanders, "Due-on-Sale: The National Picture," Mortgage Banking (October 1981).